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GETTING TO “LET’S TALK”:  COMMENTS
ON COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES
Carrie Menkel-Meadow1
Bradley Karkkainen’s excellent paper, Getting to “Let’s Talk”:  Legal and
Natural Destabilizations and the Future of Regional Collaboration, presents
some of the latest thinking on the use of regional, experimentalist,2 and collab-
orative processes for dealing with complex environmental issues.  These issues
include allocation of scarce resources, like water, and conflicting uses of land,
as well as competitions between development and environmental interests, such
as protection and preservation of animal species, wetlands, etc., and uses of
natural resources that lead to degradation (e.g., air pollution).  Based on the
work of his former colleagues, Charles Sabel and William Simon,3 Professor
Karkkainen argues that following an earlier period of command and control
public litigation involving prescriptive and rigid injunctive relief, monitored by
courts, we have now moved to a period in which courts declare constitutional
or statutory violations (“destabilizing” former legal entitlements or understand-
ings) and then remand to states or other appropriate governmental actors to
reform, through negotiated processes, and correct particular legal infirmities.
Sabel and Simon have argued (as have Sabel and Dorf4) that such remanded
negotiation processes have encouraged the development of localized or
regional creative and innovative solutions to a wide variety of legal problems,
involving greater political participation (by plaintiffs, as well as defendants,
and other interested parties) and producing ultimately more satisfying, flexible,
if contingent and revisable, adaptations to competing interests.  These legal the-
orists also suggest ways in which local or regional innovation should be shared
1 A.B. Chettle, Jr. Professor of Law, Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure, Georgetown
University Law Center.  This Essay is a written summary of comments presented on Bradley
C. Karkkainen’s paper in this issue, Getting to “Let’s Talk”:  Legal and Natural Destabiliza-
tions and the Future of Regional Collaboration, 8 NEV. L.J. 811 (2008), prepared for the
Symposium, Collaboration and the Colorado River.  Thanks to our hosts, Michael and Sonja
Saltman, the Saltman Center of Dispute Resolution at UNLV, and the work of Ray Patter-
son, Jean Sternlight, and the student editors of the Nevada Law Journal for making this
interesting event happen.  I disclaim any special expertise with respect to water law and
complex environmental issues.  I offer these comments as a scholar and practitioner of col-
laborative dispute resolution processes.
2 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
3 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:  How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004).
4 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimental-
ist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000).
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and monitored by more centralized governmental institutions for both incre-
mental, but more diffused, solutions to collective problems.5
In his paper, Professor Karkkainen adds the important insight that it is not
only the threat or actuality of public law litigation that can serve a “destabiliza-
tion” function, altering the bargaining or legal endowments6 of the parties, but
that natural (disasters and catastrophes) and anthropogenic (development,
human mismanagement, or bad decision making) events7 can (and should) alter
conventional legal decision-making structures and provide the incentive to
solve problems in a different way, providing “new assignments of rights,
duties, and institutional arrangements.”8  In his paper, Professor Karkkainen
suggests that the impending “natural-anthropogenic” crisis (like an Ack-
ermanesque “constitutional moment”9) in the competition for water from the
Colorado River will necessitate some response and “bargaining from the
ground up must begin anew.”  He hopes and suggests how that bargaining
would best be accomplished by a collaborative process.
In these comments to his thoughtful paper, I offer five sets of comments.
First, I offer just a wee bit of criticism or correction about some assumptions
and key terms used by Profession Karkkainen with which I disagree (in the
context of general agreement and support for the ideas expressed in his paper).
Second, I offer my views of the factors that are likely to support or encourage
collaborative processes, especially in environmental disputes, with some refer-
ence to already existing successes.  Third, I offer some countervailing factors,
militating against collaborative successes, especially in the environmental con-
text.  Fourth, I suggest what some of the challenges or hurdles might be to
structuring successful collaborative processes (applicable both in environmen-
tal disputes, but more generally for collaborative processes in other legal and
political realms).  And finally, I offer some advice (to all of us) for what fac-
tors, strategies, and incentives there might be (or that we might help to create)
to encourage productive collaborative problem solving and negotiated decision
making, not only for water issues along the Colorado River, or for environmen-
tal issues more broadly, but for collaborative processes in what has come to be
called “new governance”10 models, including more democratic participation,
contingent and revisable decision making, and integrative, rather than distribu-
tive, solutions to scarce and other resource allocation problems.
5 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 419-69.
6 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
7 Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath are an example of both natural disaster and anthropo-
genic mismanagement, leading to concerted efforts to reconsider inter-governmental collabo-
ration processes.  See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW:
KATRINA AND BEYOND (2006).
8 Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 812.
9 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
10 See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1997).
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I. SOME DEFINITIONAL QUIBBLES
Although I generally agree that new forms of collaborative decision mak-
ing have emerged from critiques of the rigid traditional legal processes of
courts, in both large scale and “ordinary” cases (a critique I helped to create11),
it is also true and instructive that some of the classic public law litigation dis-
cussed by Sabel and Simon, from the 1960s and 1970s, in fact did use incre-
mental, inclusive, collaborative, and iterative decision making in ongoing
monitoring and review of injunctions, class action settlements, and other judi-
cial decrees.12  Efforts to reform schools (racial and class integration, decision
making, and financing13), prisons,14 police practices,15 welfare systems, voting
practices, and other public institutions,16 as well as to challenge private activity
in employment discrimination, environmental abuses, mass torts,17 and con-
sumer practices in this era frequently utilized “structural litigation” that
engaged judges, special masters, magistrate judges, and other judicial personnel
in ongoing reports and hearings for the creation of settlements and judicial
orders, contempt hearings, and other ongoing monitoring efforts.
Some of this structural litigation actually was quite collaborative.  At least
one legal scholar suggested that the lawsuits were even somewhat “collusive”
in that government officials desiring social change were happy to “cooperate”
in adversarial proceedings in order to get the judicial decree necessary to pry
loose some legislative authorization and, most importantly, funding, for legal
and social reform.18
In some cases a court appointed master19 served as the equivalent of
today’s neutral third party facilitators or mediators (true in much of the institu-
tional reform litigation on schools and prisons).  In other cases the special mas-
ters were actually experts in the fields of the litigation (also true in prison and
11 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:  The Structure of
Legal Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
12 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
13 The classic case is of course, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), but the
real action lay in the implementation litigation that followed in every major region of the
United States. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Hart v.
Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (serving as Special Master was Professor
Curtis J. Berger of the Columbia Law School).
14 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Note, “Mastering” Inter-
vention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979); Special Project, The Remedial Process in
Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978).  But see later efforts to limit
the jurisdiction and remedial powers of courts in prison litigation.  Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000).
15 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
16 See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (ruling on intervention motions in a
“reverse” discrimination action for employment and promotion of public firefighters).
17 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
18 See Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978).
19 Appointed under FED. R. CIV. P. 53.  For examples, see Susan P. Sturm, A Normative
Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991) [hereinafter Sturm, Normative
Theory]; Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma:  Strategies of Judicial Interven-
tions in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1990) [hereinafter Sturm, Strategies].
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education structural litigation).  In many of these cases there was the kind of
collaboration now being heralded in the new governance and dispute resolution
literature, but often with more limited numbers of parties (just those formally in
the litigation) and with an absence of governmental authorization and financ-
ing, both for the processes and for the outcomes they might have produced.
So, some law reform litigation was adversarial, contested in process, and
rigid or “brittle” (my word) in decree or order, but some of the litigation of this
period actually did begin some of the collaborative processes many of us now
seek to encourage.20  One need not break entirely from the past to speak
approvingly of more collaborative and iterative processes.  Even those matters
dealt with in the “shadow” of structural litigation of the past had some, if not
all, of the qualities sought by those urging new forms of governance.  We
should study and mine those cases for insights about what worked and what
didn’t when more parties were involved, when there was judicial monitoring
and reporting of progress,21 and when injunctions were contingent and modi-
fied over time.
Secondly, in a related point, I would argue that not all of the earlier struc-
tural litigation was directed at national or even state-level governance issues.
The 1960s and ’70s saw local control of such institutions as education, commu-
nity policing, and housing.  So while it is true that much of the larger structural
institutional litigation might lead a commentator to conclude that “able judges
proved to be clumsy social engineers,”22 this was not true in all cases, and it
might be instructive to contrast such failures23 with a few successes in judi-
cially mandated and monitored “responsive litigation,”24 cases where produc-
tive reporting and dialogic processes allowed for judicial interaction in
institutional reform.
Third, Professor Karkkainen states that most of the work used by Sabel
and Simon to develop the destabilization thesis was developed in the context of
20 I assert this as a former litigator of some of these lawsuits.  In the 1970s I was a legal
services lawyer (Community Legal Services in Philadelphia) and then a clinical law teacher
(University of Pennsylvania Law School) who brought both class action and individual
actions in cases seeking law reform in prison conditions, social and child welfare, and public
health systems, special education, and both public and private employment. See also Sturm,
Normative Theory, supra note 19; Sturm, Strategies, supra note 19.
21 Indeed, it could be argued that some of the more innovative forms of “problem-solving
courts,” recently used in the context of drug courts and integrated family courts, utilize
reporting and monitoring processes first used in the structural reform cases of the 1960s and
1970s. See GREG BERMAN, JOHN FEINBLATT & SARAH GLAZER, GOOD COURTS:  THE CASE
FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE (2005); Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing
Times:  The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts Are Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851 (1997).
Where the earlier cases focused more on institutional change, the recent spate of problem-
solving courts focus on individual change and structured behavior modification.  And, some-
what ironically, we could say that national and global behavior modification is what we
might need for environmental success. See, e.g., AL GORE, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH
(2006).
22 Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 811.
23 Such as the decades-long litigation of the Chicago public housing case, Hills v. Gau-
treaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
24 The term “responsive litigation” is my own, but it derives from notions of highly devel-
oped “responsive law” in a third stage of legal development described by PHILIPPE NONET &
PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION:  TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (2001).
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public law litigation (civil rights and civil liberties cases, resting primarily on
constitutional or federal statutory grounds).  In fact some of the earlier struc-
tural litigation did also occur in the private sector (admittedly often using fed-
eral laws, like employment and public accommodations anti-discrimination
laws), but effectuating legal changes in private settings (such as employment,
hotels, restaurants, and commercial enterprises).  This may seem like a small
point, but in the modern move to more collaborative processes it is often impor-
tant to engage public-private collaborations (certainly in the environmental and
land use arena), and so the use of litigation to “destabilize” legal entitlements
may be just as significant for private parties as for public entities subject to
constitutional and other governance mandates.  Thus, the use of litigation or
other “destabilizing” events or conditions (of which law is only one form) is
relevant for consideration in both public and private sector activity.
Finally, my last point of disagreement is a mistake made by Professor
Karkkainen that is commonly made by both legal scholars and practitioners.
He states that while he is generally optimistic “about the possibilities for col-
laborative solutions to complex environmental and natural resources
problems,” he also suspects, unlike alternative dispute resolution experts, who
“tend to see opportunities for negotiated . . . solutions behind every bush,” that
there will not always be a “win-win solution”25 to such problems.
Unlike dispute resolution populists who coined the phrase “win-win,”
more serious scholars of negotiated processes generally don’t use that term,
which in a sense, over promises what dispute resolution proponents suggest is a
Pareto superior process.  “Win-win” suggests that all parties to a negotiated
solution will “win” something out of a voluntary engagement with other par-
ties.  In reality, sophisticated dispute resolution scholars and practitioners know
that “win-win” is seldom really possible.26  What such dispute resolution advo-
cates promise, wisely, is that the parties can be made better off with a problem-
solving negotiation process than they would be without engaging in such a
process at all.27
Thus, negotiation and collaborative processes do not promise “win-win”
but “better than” (whatever the comparative baseline might be—contested liti-
gation with limited parties, non-collaborative, non-interactive, and non-iterative
processes, or traditional notice, comment, and litigious administrative
processes).  Collaborative or negotiated processes permit both certain kinds of
25 Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 823.
26 A “win-win” solution may be quite possible in a variety of transactional settings, where
negotiators are creating new entities or new contractual relations and increased joint gain is
possible for all parties, but this is less true in dispute negotiations.  Think especially of how
one could never characterize plea bargaining as “win-win.”  When a criminal defendant bar-
gains for a “reduced” or better sentence, he may still be going to jail, which will hardly be
experienced as a “win,” even for someone who is contrite or remorseful about what he did.
The same can be said for the payment of damages or fines by any settling defendant in a civil
suit.  The damages may be diminished but there is still payment for a “wrong,” whether
admitted or not.  For distinctions between dispute and deal negotiations, see ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING:  NEGOTIATING
TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000), and Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11.
27 Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything:  The Lawyer as Problem
Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (2000).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ304.txt unknown Seq: 6 18-AUG-08 12:51
840 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:835
processes (patterns of communication and dispute resolution management,
especially with a third party neutral or facilitator) and the potential for different
kinds of solutions (contingent, iterative, value added, joint gain, future ori-
ented, and with multiple parties, more sources of ideas, as well as resources28).
So a wise and more precise description of what dispute resolution proponents
actually suggest would both offer more optimism for the use of such processes,
as well as avoid “over promising” of what may not be possible.
This is important not just for its semantic precision but because if one of
the problems is, as Professor Karkkainen suggests, getting those who believe a
problem is a zero-sum game (or a battle for limited and necessarily divisible
resources) to come to the table, we must provide an accurate description of
what actually might happen at the table.  Though Professor Karkkainen labels
this, “Getting to Let’s Talk,” I would call it (also adopting the felicitous phras-
ing of Roger Fisher’s “Getting to Yes”29), “Getting to the Table,” and to get to
the table we must accurately describe what expectations the parties might have
about how the different processes on offer might produce “better than,” rather
than “win-win,” solutions.
It is with those few foundational quibbles I now turn to what we can learn
from Professor Karkkainen’s insights about how we might use destabilizing
events to create more collaborative “bottom up” processes to solve or at least
ameliorate significant water, environmental, and other issues.
II. THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE:  FACTORS
ENCOURAGING COLLABORATION
Professor Karkkainen’s paper recounts several examples of relatively suc-
cessful collaborative processes in environmental settings:  the Southern Califor-
nia gnatcatcher-Endangered Species threatened “listing” to produce the Natural
Communities Conservation Planning scheme for development and conserva-
tion, and a water quality lawsuit in Southern Florida producing a joint federal-
state Everglades restoration effort.30  In both of these examples, either actual or
threatened lawsuits or changes in legal statuses forced parties with conflicting
interests (including public land or resource use and private interests, such as
developers) to negotiate new agreements for the uses of resources (land, species
conservation, and water).  These negotiations occurred within the “shadow” of
28 These claims for the advantages of collaborative negotiated processes are well argued in
the now canonical texts of negotiation and ADR. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY,
GETTING TO YES (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991); DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE
MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:  BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN
(1986); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); LAWRENCE SUSS-
KIND ET AL., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (1999) [hereinafter THE CONSENSUS
BUILDING HANDBOOK]; RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THE-
ORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965); MARY PARKER FOLLETT, Constructive Conflict, in
PROPHET OF MANAGEMENT:  A CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS FROM THE 1920S, at 67 (Pauline
Graham ed., 1996); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why Hasn’t
the World Gotten to Yes?:  An Appreciation and Some Reflections, 22 NEGOTIATION J. 485
(2006).
29 See sources cited supra note 28.
30 Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 816-19.
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the law, with recognition by all parties that legal proceedings would likely be
too rigid, time consuming, costly, and inadequate.  Both cases also involve rec-
ognition that “older” laws might not deal with new developments (increased
population growth and development in both regions), with needs of expansion
of available resources (water) and other allocation problems.
In the Southern-Florida-Everglades case there was also important political
leadership from a future-thinking Governor (Chiles).  This may be an important
condition for successful interjurisdictional collaborations where federal-state
partnerships may be necessary to end a conflict or ameliorate an adverse envi-
ronmental, economic, or social situation.  As Professor Karkkainen notes with
these examples, with plural legal jurisdictions it is now possible that federal
lawsuits or regulatory actions, citizen lawsuits or other protest actions, as well
as state legal action, can all serve as “destabilization” events requiring multiple
parties, from several legal jurisdictions, to come to the table to reconfigure
legal, economic, political, and social relationships, in order to solve a legal or
governmental problem.
Professor Karkkainen goes on to suggest that non-legal, “natural and
anthropogenic” events (such as the Love Canal incident in New York state, the
Bhopal disaster in India, the Santa Barbara oil spill in the 1960s, Hurricane
Katrina, September 11, severe draught or flooding, fires, earthquakes, heat
waves, ice storms, volcanic eruptions, global warming, resource mismanage-
ment, and natural scarcity) can or have produced the kind of crisis that provides
incentives for parties to attempt to solve problems “from the ground up” (with
political, governmental, and community collaboration) without waiting for liti-
gation or command and control orders to emerge (later, at great expense, and
with less “buy-in” or legitimacy).  While crisis responses can give expression
to generous and creative,31 if episodic, “fellow-feeling” to re-engage the polity
in decision making and implementation of solutions, the challenge in such situ-
ations is to make the crisis-driven or episodic cooperation more long-lasting or
responsive to longer-standing or on-going community needs.
There are some positive indicators pointing in the way of incentives for
greater collaboration in environmental, as well as other governmental, problem
31 I do not in this Essay analyze the important differences between crisis responses in such
natural and anthropogenic events as September 11, Hurricane Katrina, and Southern Califor-
nia wildfires, but this is an important part of any analysis of collaborative processes.  From
these few examples it is easy to see that, as is often the case, the better resourced (New York,
San Diego, and Los Angeles) will be advantaged in collaborative and ameliorative efforts.
The response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that poverty, class, and race will continue to
play a significant role in resource allocation and can have significant impacts on collabora-
tive processes, just as they do in more traditional legal or economic activity.  There is a
whole strand of important literature in the dispute resolution field, worrying about and docu-
menting how inequalities may be recapitulated or exacerbated in less “formal” processes.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:  Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; Gary LaFree & Christine Rack,
The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and
Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 767 (1996).  As the disparities in disaster
response are documented in comparative analysis of Katrina and other recovery efforts, we
are likely to see further evidence of this significant problem.  One answer of course, is an old
one—better advocates for those who are disempowered in the political regime, economy,
and society generally.
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solving.  First, and most importantly, since the birth and heyday of institutional
law reform litigation, a new field of process expertise has developed and is
burgeoning—the field of mediation, facilitation, and consensus building.  In the
last two decades, a field of multi-party conflict resolution has developed an
extensive body of knowledge (both technical, as in group dynamics and coali-
tional behavior,32 decision rules,33 social and cognitive psychology,34 and pro-
cedural, including meeting management, and process rules for mediation and
collaborative events35).  Using this expertise, a group of talented and multi-
disciplinary expert facilitators or leaders of collaborative processes has been
developed.  The field includes an ideological and political commitment to “bot-
tom up” and inclusive participation by all affected and interested parties.36
There is much evidence of success of such processes as consensus building in
local, state, federal, and interjurisdictional consensus building in environmen-
tal, transportation, financial, health, community development, social services,
and inter-ethnic group relations issues, conflicts, and policy decision making.37
As Professor Karkkainen notes, a commitment by an important government
official to the use of this new expertise can be instrumental in its success.  In
addition to the Southern California example he cites, Bruce Babbitt as Secre-
tary of the Interior, and long a proponent of collaborative processes (from his
law practice), used Endangered Species “destabilization” threats to create posi-
tive collaborations and negotiations in habitat regulatory processes (or, as he
has called them, “quasi-legislative dispute resolution” or LDR38).  Similarly,
Governor John Kitzhaber of Oregon actively promoted collaborative processes
in his state, including such issues as transportation policy (the development of
32 IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK:  PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOS (2d ed. 1983); James K. Sebenius, Sequencing to Build Coalitions:  With Whom
Should I Talk First?, in WISE CHOICES:  DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS (Richard
Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?  Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000).
33 LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 189-94, 198-203 (2d
ed. 2001).
34 BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); MAX  H.
BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY (1992); THOMPSON, supra
note 33; Chris Guthrie, Insights from Cognitive Psychology, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 42 (2004);
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, in THE
NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 351 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds.,
2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Governance, in BLACKWELL HAND-
BOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 567 (2004); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up
Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2006).
35 THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 28; LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND & JEF-
FREY L. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES:  THE NEW WAY TO RUN YOUR MEET-
ING, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS (2006); David A. Straus, Managing Meetings to
Build Consensus, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 287.
36 This commitment is based in Habermassian principles of participation in decision making
by those affected by decisions. See, e.g., J ¨URGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996); 1 J ¨URGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 (2004/05).
37 See case studies in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 28.
38 Bruce Babbitt, ADR Concepts:  Reshaping the Way Natural Resources Decisions Are
Made, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LITIG., Jan. 2001, at 13, 14.
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access exit/land use39).  There have been many successful uses of a process
termed “reg-neg” or negotiated rulemaking utilizing the expertise of this new
field to create governmental rules and regulations out of collaborative and
negotiated processes, rather than litigative, administrative, and contested
processes.40
Second, there has been increased use of incremental, flexible, and contin-
gent agreements in complex matters, recognizing that parties that get to the
table may work out tentative solutions, those that need to be tested and evalu-
ated both scientifically and politically, and then renegotiated in light of new
information or changed circumstances such as “adaptive management” in the
environmental area.  Following on from the days of monitoring compliance
with institutional injunctions (as in prison, school reform, and employment dis-
crimination cases), collaborative processes can result in regulations, consent
decrees, settlements, legislative, contingent multi-party “compacts” or con-
tracts, and they often have “reopener” clauses to revisit agreements and com-
mitments when facts or circumstances change.
Third, as Professor Karkkainen notes,41 more parties (particularly devel-
opers in environmental settings, but also utilities, private resource managers,
and even commercial enterprises like Wal-Mart) have begun to take “forward
looking” or prophylactic action when they fear a change of governmental rules,
a new lawsuit or changed circumstances, or they seek to avoid the transaction
costs of litigating zoning or other regulatory processes rather than negotiating
directly with a community.  In a growing number of land, water, and other
resource cases, parties choose to come to the table to negotiate an agreement
about use, allocation, taxation, and other issues before there is a legal change or
an actual crisis.  While there may be the threat of a looming natural or anthro-
pogenic (including lawmaking) event (encouraging bargaining in the “shadow”
of destabilization or crisis events), wise actors now see the benefits of negotiat-
ing joint-gain, interest satisfying, or maximizing benefits to as many parties as
possible before the crisis event occurs.  This is called collaborative planning or
“partnering,”42 and collaborative negotiation processes have been used effec-
tively in land use and other environmental planning processes, both for ordi-
nary land use planning and in more crisis types of events.43  This is especially
important to recognize when there are temporal variations in “triggering
events.”  Hurricane Katrina was a single, disastrous event that occurred more or
39 See, e.g., Videotape:  Building Consensus:  Transportation Rulemaking in Oregon (Policy
Consensus Initiative 2000).
40 Though the variable success of these processes is still hotly debated among their users
and scholars. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus:  The Promise and Perform-
ance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Freeman, supra note 10; Philip
J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors:  The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000).
41 Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 827.
42 The concept of pre-dispute planning for good multi-party relationships on major projects
and transactions originated in the construction field. See, e.g., FRANK CARR ET AL.,
PARTNERING IN CONSTRUCTION:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PROJECT SUCCESS (1999).
43 See, e.g., JOHN FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE PRACTITIONER:  ENCOURAGING PAR-
TICIPATORY PLANNING PROCESSES (1999).
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less “suddenly,”44 but it now looks more like an example of the gradual degra-
dation of resources (such as the Everglades) because of the anthropogenic mis-
assessment and mismanagement of the levees in Louisiana.
Thus, there does seem to be some greater sensitivity to the role of timing
in these efforts at collaborative problem solving.  There are variations between
those that are triggered by a single crisis event, those that are attempts to deal
with more gradual erosion or degradation of resources, and those that attempt
to avoid a problematic future, or plan for a more constructive future.  These
temporal variations are similar to efforts to develop taxonomies for different
types of mass torts (single catastrophic events, like building collapses, degrada-
tion like dam breaks, medical device failures, or slower, harmful, hazardous,
and toxic products or resources (asbestos, chemical waste in water, etc.)).45
Fourth, related to both of the above developments, there is increased rec-
ognition of the need for and use of evaluation, both of processes used and of
outcomes developed.  So when parties adopt a water or other resource use,
evaluation is built into the agreement.  When measures and metrics demonstrate
a need for change because some strategy is not working, the parties must return
to the table.  Agreements made can be objectively based on particular evalua-
tive criteria that trigger renegotiation, or specific time limits can be used to re-
visit and evaluate what is working and what is not.
Finally, as the Everglades example illustrates, there has been an increase,
likely out of necessity, for intergovernmental and interjurisdictional collabora-
tion.  Most modern problems (environmental, land use, resource allocation,
finances, natural disasters, human resources) will often transcend political
boundary lines.  Increasingly, governmental and community units have been
willing or forced to engage in processes that require collaboration and coopera-
tion from several political entities (local, state, and federal) or contiguous units
(multiple states in a region, as is the case with Colorado River water alloca-
tions) in order to solve problems and effectuate change.  Similarly, whether for
better or worse, public and private partnerships (in utilities, major dam and
other construction, agricultural uses, resource harvesting, and conservation,
etc.) have proven successful and necessary to solve some of the anthropogenic
and natural disasters described by Professor Karkkainen.  As with intergovern-
mental collaboration, public-private partnerships often need brokering, media-
tion, and management by those skilled in the new process expertise of
consensus building and multi-party mediation.
The development of expertise, a body of knowledge, evaluation and met-
rics, and most importantly, a new generation of professional process facilitators
and managers of deliberative democracy are all indicators of a positive trajec-
tory for the use of collaborative decision-making processes.  Nevertheless,
44 There is still the question of whether weather predictions permit more planning, such as
for evacuation and ameliorative efforts, than a man-made disaster like September 11 or a less
predictable earthquake.
45 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty:  The Use of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587 (1995);
Francis E. McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 871 (2001).
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there are also some contraindications to progress in collaborative decision mak-
ing to which I now turn.
III. COUNTERVAILING FACTORS:  IMPEDIMENTS TO
COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES
What do we do when water is power?  Or, to put it another way, as Profes-
sor Karkkainen46 and many others have done, what do we do when the “haves”
control not just the resources in question but also the political power or the
bargaining power needed to negotiate and collaborate?47  I say this as a some-
time resident of the water-hungry and greedy city of Los Angeles, most
famously depicted for its corrupt, and power and money driven water policies
seen in the film Chinatown.48  How can we make the “haves” sit down with the
“have nots” (and bargain in good faith49)?
And speaking of Chinatown, as someone who has just returned from
China, what do we do when we are internationally interdependent with other
countries who may not share either our legal regimes or environmental or other
goals?  Recent differences in the acceptability and regulation of toxic toys,
defective goods, and air pollution in China have a large impact on the United
States.  In Colorado River water policy, Mexico is also clearly an interested
party.  And, lest you think I am concerned that others will not bargain with us,
there is the United States’ refusal to participate in the Kyoto Accords and inter-
national global warming reduction negotiations.
Thus, at both domestic levels of power, and international levels of
unshared political and economic goals and inadequate legal regimes, what can
we do when we cannot bring all the interested parties to the table, or be assured
that once at the table they will bargain as “equal” parties?
The legal destabilization rights described by Professors Sabel, Simon, and
Karkkainen may not apply when we are dealing in an international environment
without the “force” or “rule” of law that can be used to motivate collaborative
processes.  Perhaps in this setting, more serious natural or anthropogenic trig-
ger events may be better motivators—consider the global response (at least for
aid) in the wake of the 2004 Tsunami in Southeast Asia.  If legal claims (law-
suits, threats of regulation, etc.) are the incentive and sources for “destabiliza-
tion” rights that lead to collaboration in domestic matters, we may have a
further level of difficulty in the transnational locus of many environmental and
resource disputes (not to mention nuclear power and weapons development, as
well as traditional state to state or internal violent conflicts), where there is very
little binding law or credible threats of legal action to motivate negotiated
46 Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 823.
47 See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves”
Come Out Ahead in Alternative Justice Systems?:  Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 19 (1999).
48 CHINATOWN (Paramount Pictures 1974).
49 The question of what good faith bargaining is in such “quasi-legal” contexts is itself a
complicated issue. See, e.g., John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote
Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69
(2002).
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processes.  If law and legal rights are the “destabilization threats” in domestic
settings, is violence, conflict, death, disease, or planetary health the non-legal
equivalent in transnational issues?
Then there is the question of resources for collaboration.  Who will pay
the costs of collaborative negotiations?  These costs include structuring and
facilitating meetings (paying those expert facilitators described above), travel
and time costs for participants, as well as facilities fees, etc.  While the incen-
tive to collaborate is often to save the transaction costs of litigation or other
command and control options, collaborative processes are not themselves trans-
action cost free—in time, money, and opportunity costs.  And, in at least some
forms of legislative, administrative, or litigative solutions, many of the costs
will be borne by the state.
Finally, there is the problem of the institutional or process pessimist.
Some subscribe to gloom and doom scenarios with respect to environmental
usage and are skeptical that any “mushy” collaborative process can solve zero-
sum resource or complex scientific problems.50  Others prefer to defer to future
generations or other decision makers (as the Bush Administration’s denial of
global warming seems to do).  How do we get reluctant parties (for whatever
complex and multifarious motives) to come to the table?
IV. CHALLENGES PRESENTED TO THE USE OF COLLABORATIVE PROCESSES
I have outlined a few specific impediments to the use of collaborative
processes above.  Here I want to suggest a few more general challenges to the
use of collaborative negotiation or governance models, so that I might suggest
some productive responses.
First, to the extent that Professor Karkkainen’s model of destabilization
rights is built on Sabel and Simon’s conception of legal rights and the threat of
court intervention, we must ask whether we need strong, enforceable, up-to-
date, and relatively unambiguous legal entitlements and endowments for this
form of destabilization to be a credible threat.  What happens when, in the
domestic context, legal rules are ambiguous or arguable or have not kept pace
with environmental or technological change?  If a powerful “have” wants to
grab resources or delay through objections, continuing to litigate and contest
legal doctrines and meanings may remain an option.
In the international context where there are few, if any, enforceable legal
endowments, “destabilization” is unlikely to occur through threats of lawsuits
or regulation.  The closest tool we have (and many have argued it is powerful)
is entry to international communities and treaties, as well as trade benefits
(such as WTO membership and multi-lateral trade treaties and regional eco-
nomic alliances like the EU, NAFTA, or Mercosur), but hold-outs or those who
see the advantages of economic development without environmental sus-
tainability cannot be coerced to come to the collaborative bargaining table.
Thus, as Professor Karkkainen suggests, and I want to reinforce, we may
do better (in the sense of encouraging) with natural or anthropogenic triggers
50 For a critique of such a process, without sufficient structuring and evaluation, see Alejan-
dro E. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture:  Learning About Ecosystem Management from the
Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942 (2008).
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than with legal triggers—weather and man-made disasters that have affected
millions of people have been able to galvanize social action in recent years far
more effectively than more formal and traditional legal or diplomatic processes.
Second, as noted above, “getting to the table” may be very difficult in
multi-party settings where it may be necessary to have all, not some, of the
parties participate in and enforce and implement a final agreement.  Multi-party
negotiations are different from bilateral negotiations.  A few can always gang
up or exclude others (that is coalition theory51), and a single “hold-out” may
have veto power over any deal that requires all.  These problems of participa-
tion, joint gain, veto power, and negotiation management demonstrate just how
important negotiation and dispute resolution expertise is, but it must be married
to realist political science and governance theory and practice.  How a process
is designed and what incentives (sticks and carrots) can be brought to bear on
the parties is crucial (and very difficult, especially when leaders, legislators, or
private CEOs and boards change over time).
Third (and related to my last point), even if a special triggering event
(whether a crisis or a more gradual degradation) occurs and results in a collabo-
rative process that produces some kind of agreement, compact, or resource allo-
cation system, how can such “episodic” successes be translated into long-term
monitoring and management?  Many of the so-called successes noted both in
Professor Karkkainen’s paper and in others I have cited here require enormous
commitment on the part of the parties and political leadership.  What happens
when that leadership changes or the commitment wanes?  As many of us have
learned from mediation practice, a good agreement without a good implementa-
tion, management, evaluation, and feedback plan may be no agreement at all.
With all the challenges suggested here about “getting to talk” or “getting to the
table,” there may be bigger challenges to successfully “leaving the table” (con-
cluding an enforceable, implementable agreement) or “staying at the table” (for
the difficult task of implementation and enforcement).
Fourth, what do we do about possible externalities?  If a good collabora-
tive water use agreement is reached for the present, how do we account for the
potential loss for future generations or those downstream?  If the American
states along the Colorado River make their own accommodations with each
other, what impact will that have on Mexico?  And what moral, political, or
other concerns should we consider?  Who will stand in for the costs we impose
on non-participating parties or the benefits that we fail to confer on the absent
or unrepresented parties, such as future generations?52
Fifth, how do we prevent ourselves from either over-reacting or under-
reacting to whatever crisis or trigger forces us to the collaborative negotiation
process?  This is the danger of primacy and recency—a heuristic error we often
make legislating, regulating, or deciding something from the last terrible thing
that has happened, without taking proper account of other possible dangers,
51 See THOMPSON, supra note 33; Sebenius, supra note 32.
52 I have raised these ethical and moral questions with respect to all forms of negotiation
and mediation, where a set of parties make an agreement, whether voluntary and consensual,
or “forced” in some way, that has an impact on others not present. CARRIE MENKEL-
MEADOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, WHAT’S FAIR:  ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS (2004).
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disasters, or “unknowables.”53  How can we be sure that whatever collaborative
process we convene will deal adequately with all the issues that might have an
impact on the problem we are trying to solve?
So, with all of these impediments and challenges to collaborative
processes, can we be as hopeful or sanguine as Professor Karkkainen would
like us to be about the possibility of either crisis-driven or good will “forward
looking” collaborative processes in environmental and other governance
issues?  Below I offer some advice for how to meet these challenges.
V. MEETING THE CHALLENGES FOR COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
PROCESSES:  ADVICE FOR THOSE WHO WANT TO “GET TO TALK”
For those of us who think that better solutions to modern social, legal,
political, and environmental problems are more likely to occur with par-
ticipatory, inclusive, and collaborative processes that respond to difficulties in
modern governance, what can we do to make the use of such processes more
likely?
First, it is important to consider what kinds of events can serve as motivat-
ing or incentivizing “triggers” for convening interested parties with an interest
or stake in solving a particular problem (government agencies, community
groups, environmental groups, private parties).  Professor Karkkainen’s paper
focuses on two types of more emergent “triggers”—legal “destabilization”
events such as lawsuits, threatened regulatory action, or other threatened legal
action (which could be lawsuits, administrative regulation, or legislation), and
anthropogenic or natural events, such as physical disasters, or human misman-
agement causing crises or serious degradation of resources of some kind.  He
recognizes in his paper that it is also possible that occasionally some good will
and “forward looking” party or set of parties will realize it makes sense to
convene a process absent an immediate crisis or trigger, and act more proac-
tively to deal with a potential problem or for future resource planning.
So, as one suggestion, we need to think carefully and proactively about the
anthropogenic construction of “triggering events” for convening collaborative
processes.  Most of the examples described by Professor Karkkainen reflect a
reactive or responsive process after a crisis of some kind has arisen.  Crises are
important motivators, but in many cases convening when there are problems to
be solved before there are extreme positions or hardened interests in a specific
situation might produce more effective collaboration and creative solutions.
Second, to the extent that I have suggested a wide variety of impediments
and challenges to convening collaborative processes, especially under condi-
tions of unequal power and international (or non-legally bound) parties, it is
essential to look for linkages in issues that might bring parties to a table, give
them an interest in looking for solutions and trading and bargaining.  So, while
the United States might seem the more “powerful” party in many negotiations
with Mexico, the pollution of water and air in Baja California and San Diego
and California’s needs to have clean water, air, beaches, fish, etc. for the Cali-
53 JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:  STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOM-
INGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
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fornia economy and health of its citizens gives Mexico an interest in demand-
ing assistance and cooperation on a variety of other issues (e.g., immigration,
labor, trade).  Like looking for linkages of seemingly irrelevant and uncon-
nected issues, recognition of mutual interdependence (such as is true in global
warming initiatives) may enhance possibilities for “getting to talk.”  And, as we
have learned from negotiation theory, in complex, multi-party, multi-issue
negotiations it is actually better to have more, rather than fewer, issues.  There
are gains to be made from trades, especially when there are complementary
interests.54
Third, it might enhance motivation to participate if “positive” triggering
events (not only negative crises) could be identified.  Opportunities for mutual
gain include trade, technical exchange, educational exchange, joint venture
energy projects, tourism and cultural exchange, and shared revenues from taxa-
tion, etc.  There has been a marked increase in regional collaborations over
infrastructure, ports, airports, energy, water, etc. in domestic settings and
regional collaborations with shared economic gain and efficient specialization
in international settings.  Where collaborations are established over “positive or
joint gain” possibilities, communication lines may be open for when things get
tough on scarce resources, disasters, or other “competitive” issues.
Fourth, it is not enough to identify problems or triggering events, it helps
to generate creative solutions, sometimes apart from a litigative or bargaining
setting.  As Professor Karkkainen describes, Professor Joseph Sax’s reconcep-
tion of the public trust doctrine was an innovative recharacterization of legal
relationships, initially set in a more abstract context and then applied to a vari-
ety of concrete environmental situations.55  Similarly, development of creative
solutions to problems may need to be tested experimentally and intellectually
before they can become viable alternatives in concrete situations.  (Think about
trading pollution credits as one such example.)
Fifth, as a corollary to some of the comments above, if there is to be legal
destabilization to encourage collaborative processes, with the possibility of
using creative solutions to solve complex problems, there will still be a need for
the development and enactment of legal entitlements and endowments.  To the
extent that law does provide one of the major “triggers” for collaborative
processes, it cannot be abandoned by informal dispute resolution advocates or
those who govern.  There will always be a need and room for advocacy, to
create needed and important baseline endowments and entitlements, to give
54 See Menkel-Meadow, supra notes 11, 27, 36; see also LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 28.
Linkage in negotiations is common in diplomatic negotiations, as in current negotiations
with North Korea. See, e.g., MICHAEL WATKINS & SUSAN ROSEGRANT, BREAKTHROUGH
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION:  HOW GREAT NEGOTIATORS TRANSFORMED THE WORLD’S
TOUGHEST POST-COLD WAR CONFLICTS (2001).
55 Karkkainen, supra note 1, at 814.  Professor Sax can be credited with many legally crea-
tive and innovative ideas, such as his work on slumlordism as a tort.  Joseph L. Sax & Fred
J. Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1967) (arguing for both regula-
tory action and a cause of action for private litigation).  I have argued for the need for “legal
creativity” in effective problem solving. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha?  Is Creativity
Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 97 (2001).
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parties power and representation in important environmental (and other govern-
ance) settings.
Sixth, as some of the illustrations above suggest, never underestimate the
power of leadership—Governors Chiles (Florida) and Kitzhaber (Oregon) took
active roles in shifting process dynamics in some of the problems facing their
states, by falling away from their “swords” and seeking to engage multiple
parties in alternative solutions, through multi-party consensus building
processes.  Secretary Babbitt risked controversial legal action by threatening
listing on the Endangered Species List, and other western governors (from con-
servative states) have been among those most encouraging of collaborative pol-
icy initiatives about land use, resource conservation, and wildlife.56
Seventh, no one template will be the quick fix for all collaborative
processes.  If the alternative dispute resolution movement has taught us any-
thing, it is that process pluralism, variability, and flexibility in process design,
tailored for particular disputes and parties, may be necessary for effectiveness
in different settings.57  As I have argued in other settings, Jon Elster’s rigorous
comparisons of constitutional processes (differences in publicity and trans-
parency vs. secrecy and confidentiality, and principled vs. trading and bargain-
ing processes) demonstrate that different processes may be appropriate for
different settings, levels of government, and whether problems are constitutive,
organizational, or ad hoc.58
Eighth, there is growing recognition that many governance decisions,
including even constitutive ones (the making of constitutions), might need to be
transitional, contingent, and flexible, with ongoing processes and opportunities
for reconsideration and reopening and renegotiation as conditions change and
political systems mature.59
Finally, it is important in this new form of collaborative governance to
avoid gross generalizations.  We are in an important period of “democratic
experimentalism,” trying out different models of political, social, and economic
decision making, in the context of enormously complex problems that implicate
multiple jurisdictions and a great variety of parties.  What is needed is “thick
description”60 and comparisons of successes as well as failures.  Consider com-
parisons of several notable disaster litigation cases (the Buffalo Creek disas-
ter,61 Agent Orange,62 September 11,63 and Woburn water pollution64), some
56 See Policy Consensus Institute, 2007 Board of Directors, http://www.policyconsensus.
org/about/board.html.
57 CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER & JEAN
R. STERNLIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL chs. 11-14, 16
(2005); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice:  Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of
Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553 (2006).
58 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 36; Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in BARRI-
ERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 34, at 237.
59 Elster, supra note 58; Vicki C. Jackson, What’s in a Name?  Reflections on Timing, Nam-
ing, and Constitution-Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1249 (2008).
60 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:  FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOL-
OGY (3d ed. 2000).  For examples of such thick descriptions in this field of collaborative
policy and legal decision making, see the case studies reported in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK, supra note 28, and the webpages of the Policy Consensus Initiative, policycon-
sensus.org, and the Consensus Building Institute, cbuilding.org.
61 GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ304.txt unknown Seq: 17 18-AUG-08 12:51
Spring 2008] ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 851
handled with class action treatment, some with mediation and special masters,
others with private settlements and consent decrees, and the difference in legis-
lative enactments for the mass diseases (caused by modern industrialization) in
Black Lung (federal worker’s compensation program65) and asbestos (where
every effort to legislate a compensation program has so far failed, leaving hun-
dreds of thousands of cases being litigated (or settled) in an overtaxed legal
system).  Scholars have focused on a variety of negotiated rulemaking
processes and problem-solving courts to assess whether outcomes differ and are
longer lasting depending on what processes are used.66  We need to continue to
create new processes, experiment with them, describe them, and evaluate them.
To the extent that new collaborative processes might emerge from envi-
ronmental problems and conflicts, such as have been suggested here for the
Colorado River and water usage in the western states, we may have the oppor-
tunity to craft positive anthropogenic solutions to complex natural and anthro-
pogenic problems.
The following summarizes the “take-home” points of my reflections on
Professor Karkkainen’s paper on the possible uses of collaborative processes to
deal with environmental problems, resource allocation, and governmental and
public policy decision making:
Factors Encouraging Collaborative Processes:
1. Development of a body of knowledge and field of expertise in consensus
building and collaborative governance
2. Increased use of contingent, flexible and incremental agreements in complex
matters
3. More use of prophylactic “forward looking” problem solving and
collaboration
4. Recognition of need for evaluation
5. Increased use of intergovernmental and interjurisdictional collaborative
processes
Impediments to Collaborative Processes:
1. Unequal bargaining power in participating parties (“haves vs. have nots”)
2. Lack of background legal regime for bargaining endowments and legal
destabilization in international settings
3. Transaction costs in collaboration (actual costs and opportunity costs)
4. Psychological impediments “doom and gloom”—skeptical or pessimistic
assumptions and outlooks (e.g., assumptions of scarcity)
62 PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL:  MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS
(1986).
63 KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?  THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COM-
PENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005).
64 JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
65 Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000).
66 See sources cited supra note 40.
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Challenges in the Use of Collaborative Processes:
1. Need for clear, unambiguous, and enforceable legal rights for legal
“destabilization” to serve as incentive for collaborative processes
2. Incentives for participation of all necessary parties to a multi-party collabo-
ration—practical and ethical problems when not everyone participates
3. Translation of “episodic” or event-driven agreements for long-term manage-
ment and implementation
4. Externalities?  Effects on those outside the collaborative process, e.g., future
generations and absent parties in environmental settings
5. Danger of primacy or recency affecting best possible solutions for longer
term
Suggestions for Meeting the Challenges and Encouraging Collaborative
Processes:
1. Consider a variety of “triggering events” for collaborative processes;
destabilizations can occur from legal, natural, anthropogenic events or actions,
and different sources of triggers may lead to the need for different kinds of
processes
2. Look for linkages in issues and interdependence among parties to encourage
reluctant parties to participate in good faith
3. Look for “positive” or proactive trigger events or incentives—do not wait
for only negative, crisis-driven opportunities to negotiate
4. Develop creative solutions to complex legal and other problems “away from
the table” and separate from the crisis
5. Pursue, develop, and enact needed legal endowments to create incentives
and baseline entitlements, bargaining power, and effective advocacy
6. Leadership
7. Process pluralism—one size/template will not fit all
8. Recognize need for transitional, incremental, and contingent agreements
with opportunities for reopeners and renegotiation
9. Thick descriptions—evaluate successes and failures in terms of outcome
and process measures
If we can utilize some of the recent learning of how complex multi-party
processes work, and learn to evaluate them as they are employed and modified
in different contexts, we may begin to build some knowledge and experience
with “getting to the table to talk” and collaborate on how we humans (and
animals and other life) can learn to share and productively cohabit and use this
earth.
